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ARTICLE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE CONTINUING
STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
COLLEGE SPORTS ON THE EVE OF TITLE
IX’S FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY
BRIAN L. PORTO*

INTRODUCTION
After Congress’s 1972 enactment of Title IX, which outlaws sex
discrimination in education by recipients of federal funds, the then-Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) drafted proposed regulations to
implement the new law and invited public comment on them.1 More than ninety
percent of the ten-thousand-plus comments that HEW received about Title IX
addressed its application to athletics, even though fewer than ten percent of the
proposed regulations applied directly to athletics, physical education, or
recreation.2 The sports-heavy nature of the public comments prompted
Secretary Caspar Weinberger to quip, “I had not realized until the comment
period that the most important issue in the U.S. today is intercollegiate
athletics.”3
In 1975, Congress approved the draft regulations,4 which took effect in

* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington, 1987; Ph.D.,
Miami University (Ohio), 1979; B.A., University of Rhode Island, 1974. I am indebted to Donna
Lopiano, Jayma Meyer, and Erin Buzuvis for their respective comments and suggestions regarding an
earlier version of this article. I am also indebted to Dr. Lopiano and to Nancy Hogshead-Makar for
providing data necessary to complete this article.
1. Title IX is codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688.
2. LINDA JEAN CARPENTER & R. VIVIAN ACOSTA, TITLE IX 6 (2005).
3. Id. at 12.
4. Id. at 6.
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1978.5 Since 1978, Americans’ cultural affinity for college sports, along with a
legal nudge from Title IX, has produced a dramatic increase in athletic
opportunities for girls and women. During the mid-1960s, only 15,000 women
played intercollegiate sports, compared to 152,000 men.6 By 1972, as Title IX
was being discussed and enacted, the number of women college athletes had
doubled to 30,000; during the next five years, as the regulations were proposed,
revised, and adopted, the number doubled again, to 63,000.7 By 2014–15, more
than 200,000 women were playing college sports, forty-three percent of the total
number of college athletes nationwide.8 Three years later, those numbers had
risen to 216,378 and forty-four percent, respectively, representing a 291 percent
increase from 1981–82.9
The increased number of women athletes on campus reflects the growing
prominence of women in higher education generally. In the autumn of 2017,
56.4 percent of the students enrolled in all undergraduate programs in the United
States were women.10 The federal Department of Education estimates that by
2026, fifty-seven percent of college students nationwide will be women.11
The growing numerical dominance of women among undergraduates has
shaped and will continue to shape colleges’ efforts to ensure the “equal
opportunity” in athletics that Title IX requires. The principal measure of equal
opportunity—the “substantial proportionality” test—requires colleges to show
that the percentage of women among their varsity athletes is substantially
proportional to the percentage of women undergraduates on campus.12
Unfortunately, institutional compliance with this standard has been the
exception, not the rule, as the twelve-point gap noted above between the
percentages of women students and women athletes shows.13 That gap equates

5. Id. at 3.
6. R. SHEP MELNICK, THE TRANSFORMATION OF TITLE IX: REGULATING GENDER EQUALITY IN
EDUCATION 86 (2018).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY ET AL., WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., CHASING EQUITY: THE TRIUMPHS,
CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SPORTS FOR GIRLS AND WOMEN 7 (2020).
10. GARY A. BERG, THE RISE OF WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION: HOW, WHY, AND WHAT’S NEXT
xiii (Rowman & Littlefield eds. 2020).
11. Id. at 7.
12. A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 239, 71414 (Dec.
11, 1979); see also GERALD GURNEY ET AL., UNWINDING MADNESS: WHAT WENT WRONG WITH
COLLEGE SPORTS AND HOW TO FIX IT 151 (2017).
13. According to Gerald Gurney and coauthors Donna Lopiano, and Andrew Zimbalist, precise data
on the Title IX compliance status of individual institutions are not available. The federal Equity in
Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA), 20 U.S.C. § 1092, requires institutions to report athletic participation
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to approximately 148,030 lost participation opportunities, meaning that if
women could participate in athletics in substantial proportionality to their
enrollment, assuming each woman played one sport, an additional 148,030
would be playing college sports.14
Therefore, as Title IX approaches its fiftieth birthday, the achievement of
equal athletic opportunities for college women remains unfinished business.15
But the continued pursuit of equal opportunity should not be just a matter of
more money, more teams, and more athletic scholarships for women. More
money, more teams, and more athletic scholarships has long been the unofficial
mantra of the male model of college sports, resulting in large expenditures for a
small number of varsity athletes and “large admissions boosts” for recruited
athletes, especially at selective institutions.16 A wiser strategy would heed the
words of James Shulman and William Bowen, who wrote two decades ago that
“Title IX should be seen as providing an opportunity to rethink the organization
and place of college sports on the campus; it should not be merely a stimulus to
replicate the male model of college athletics in women’s sports (including the
current patterns of coaching, recruitment, and admissions.”).17
A new strategy may be more viable now than ever before because it has an
unlikely ally: the novel coronavirus, better known as COVID-19. The virus

data by gender annually, but “such data are insufficient to determine Title IX compliance” because they
do not take account of permissible exceptions to the proportionality standard. GURNEY ET AL., supra
note 12, at 147–148. Part I of this article will identify the exceptions that enable an institution to comply
with Title IX without having achieved proportionality.
14. Letter from Nancy Hogshead-Makar, CEO, Champion Women and Amy Poyer, Senior Staff
Att’y, Cal. Women’s Law Ctr., to Amy Huchthausen, Commissioner, America East Conf. 3 (June 26,
2020) (on file with the author).
15. Despite that unfinished business, press and scholarly attention have shifted of late to the statute’s
relationship to sexual harassment and gender identity. See, e.g., Greta Anderson, Education
Department Releases Final Title IX Regulations, STUDENTLY (May 6, 2020), https://
www.insidehighered.com/print/news/2020/05/07/educat; Michael Levenson & Neil Vigdor, Inclusion
of Transgender Athletes Violates Title IX, Trump Administration Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2020),https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/us/connecticut-transgender-student-athletes.html;
Doriane Lambelet Coleman et al., Re-Affirming The Value of The Sports Exception To Title IX’s
General Non-Discrimination Rule, DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 69 (2020).
16. R. Shep Melnick, The Strange Evolution of Title IX, NATIONAL AFFAIRS (Summer 2018),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-strange-evolution-of-title-ix. The admissions
boost for athletes is especially consequential at small, selective institutions, such as Amherst College
in Massachusetts, where, in the fall of 2018, the student body of just under 1900 included 676 athletes,
or almost thirty-six percent, of all undergraduates. The athletes took admissions slots that, in many
cases, could have gone to more academically talented students. This issue does not arise so dramatically
at large institutions, such as the University of Alabama, where athletes are only two percent of the
undergraduates. See JEFFREY SELINGO, WHO GETS IN AND WHY: A YEAR INSIDE COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS 154 (Scribner ed., 2020).
17. JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND
EDUCATIONAL VALUES 305 (2001).
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caused the closure of campuses nationwide in March of 2020, resulting in a
significant loss of revenue and a historic purge of college athletic teams in a
wide array of sports at institutions nationwide.18 These conditions, though
regrettable in their origins, offer Title IX advocates and college-sports reformers
a chance to not only achieve gender equity in college sports, but to also reverse
the overemphasis on sports by educational institutions, particularly the
admissions preference for athletes at selective institutions.19
Toward those ends, Part I will discuss the statutory and regulatory
framework of Title IX. Part II will analyze the major cases that have interpreted
the statute and its regulations. Part III will examine why, almost fifty years after
the enactment of Title IX, most institutions still fail to satisfy its proportionality
standard. Part IV will argue for enforcement of that standard in a way that
reflects the current demographics of higher education. The article will conclude
that present circumstances offer an unprecedented opportunity to make college
sports equitable and educationally sound and will suggest ways to achieve both
goals.
I. ENFORCING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: TITLE IX’S STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND
REGULATIONS
A. The Key Words
The heart of Title IX, which has become so iconic as to have a blog and a
sports apparel company named for it,20 is the thirty-seven-word sentence: “No

18. See Aishwarya Kumar, The Heartbreaking Reality—and Staggering Numbers—of NCAA Teams
Cut During the Pandemic, ESPN (Nov. 6, 2020), espn.com/Olympics/story/-/id/30116720/theheartbreaking-reality-staggering-numbers-ncaa-teams-cut-pandemic. But some institutions that cut
teams because of the pandemic have reinstated them. For example, Dartmouth College, which cut five
teams in July 2020, reinstated all five, including two women’s teams, after a lawyer hired by the affected
students informed College officials that even before the cuts, Dartmouth was out of compliance with
Title IX, a deficiency the cuts exacerbated. Pete Nakos, Dartmouth Reverses Course, Will Reinstate
Five Varsity Sports Programs Cut in July, VALLEY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2021), vnews.com/DartmouthCollege-to-reinstate-women-s-golf-and-swimming---diving-teams-for-full-TitleIX-compliance38601387. In the NCAA’s Division I, institutions cut 112 teams in the wake of the coronavirus
epidemic but later reinstated thirty-seven, for a net loss of seventy-five teams in Division I alone. The
sports that lost the most teams were men’s tennis (15), women’s tennis (9), men’s swimming and diving
(5), women’s swimming and diving (4), baseball (5), and men’s indoor track (4). See Tracker: College
Sports Programs Cut During COVID-19 Pandemic, BUS. COLLEGE SPORTS (June 22, 2021),
businessofcollegesports.com/tracker-college-sports-programs-cut-during-covid-19-pandemic/.
19. See SHULMAN & BOWEN supra note 17, at 307. See also Tom Farrey, Why Cutting College
Varsity
Sports
Could
Be
a
Good
Thing,
N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
13,
2020),
www.nytimes.com>2020/10/13>college-sports-cuts.
20. Ellen J. Staurowsky & Erianne A. Weight, Title IX Literacy: What Coaches Don’t Know and
Need to Find Out, 4 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 190, 192 (2011). Title IX Blog is located at http://titleix-blogspot.com/.
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person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance.”21
To aid implementation of the statutory language, HEW drafted regulations
that became final in July of 1975 and carried the force of law because Congress
did not reject them during the applicable forty-five-day review period.22 One
key regulation, which pertains specifically to athletics, tracks the language of
the statute, prohibiting exclusion from participation, denial of benefits, and
disparate treatment based on sex “in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or
intramural athletics” programs offered by an educational institution that
receives federal funds.23 The same regulation states that institutions “may
operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for
such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact
sport.”24 In other words, in college sports, “separate but equal” teams
segregated by sex are permissible—indeed, they are customary—under ordinary
circumstances. Circumstances change, however, when the institution sponsors
a men’s team, but no women’s team in a sport, in which case the institution must
allow women to try out for the men’s team if the sport is noncontact.25 In the
case of a contact sport, the institution is not so obligated, even if only a men’s
team exists.26
The regulation also requires institutions to provide “equal opportunity for
members of both sexes” in sports and identifies ten factors for regulators to
consider in determining whether institutions have complied. Known as “the
laundry list,” those factors include:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members
of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;

21. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
22. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 6.
23. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2020).
24. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
25. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 10.
26. Id.
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(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.27
This regulation notes that “unequal aggregate expenditures for members of
each sex or unequal expenditures for male and female teams” do not necessarily
equate to “noncompliance” with Title IX, but that the regulators “may consider
the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex” when evaluating
equality of opportunity at a particular institution.28 The regulatory language
reflects the aim of the Javits Amendment, which was added to Title IX in 1974;
named for then-Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY), the amendment stated that
regulations, when issued, must include “reasonable provisions considering the
nature of particular sports.”29 The Javits Amendment was a compromise that
replaced the defeated Tower Amendment, named for Senator John Tower (RTX). The latter would have removed “revenue-producing sports” from the
calculations of equal opportunity under Title IX, meaning that institutions could
have continued to spend lavishly on football and men’s basketball,
shortchanging nonrevenue (including women’s) sports, the only sports that
would have figured in the “equal opportunity” calculus.30
The Javits-inspired regulatory language, then, is considerably more friendly
to the equal-opportunity aims of Title IX than the Tower language. Still, the
former recognizes athletic realities, such as that football uniforms are more
expensive than swimsuits; hence, a discrepancy in the amounts spent on
uniforms for men’s and women’s teams is not necessarily a Title IX violation.
But the institution that provides men’s teams with better-quality uniforms or
that gives male athletes home, away, and practice uniforms, yet only gives
women’s teams one set of uniforms, violates Title IX.31
Another regulation, although not devoted entirely to athletics, is

27. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2020).
28. Id.
29. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 194. See also ELIZABETH KAUFER BUSCH & WILLIAM
E. THRO, TITLE IX: THE TRANSFORMATION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION 26 (Rutledge ed.
2018); James J. Hefferan, Jr., A Sporting Chance: Biediger v. Quinnipiac University and What
Constitutes a Sport for Purposes of Title IX, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 583, 587 (2016).
30. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 194.
31. LISA MAATZ ET AL., NATIONAL COALITION FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS IN EDUCATION, TITLE IX
AT 45: ADVANCING OPPORTUNITY THROUGH EQUITY IN EDUCATION 44 (2017).
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nevertheless important because one portion of it governs athletic scholarships.32
In general, the regulation prohibits sex discrimination by educational
institutions in the awarding of financial aid to students.33 Section (c) of this
regulation, concerning athletic scholarships, requires institutions to “provide
reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each sex in proportion
to the number of students of each sex participating in interscholastic or
intercollegiate athletics.”34
Unfortunately, the Title IX regulations left many college athletic directors’
questions unanswered as their effective date, July 21, 1978, approached. By
that date, moreover, HEW had received nearly one hundred complaints against
more than fifty institutions that alleged sex discrimination in athletics. To
answer athletic directors’ questions and to investigate the complaints, HEW
issued a document titled: “Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate
Athletics” in 1979.35 The stated purpose of the Policy Interpretation was to
explain the Title IX regulations in order to “provide a framework within which
the complaints can be resolved, and to provide institutions of higher education
with additional guidance on the requirements for compliance with Title IX in
intercollegiate athletic programs.”36
B. The Policy Interpretation
The Policy Interpretation is divided into three sections: (1) “Compliance in
Financial Assistance (Scholarships) Based on Athletic Ability,” (2)
“Compliance in Other Program Areas” (i.e. the laundry list), and (3)
“Compliance in Meeting the Interests and Abilities of Male and Female
Students.”37 Regulators would determine compliance in financial assistance “by
dividing the amounts of aid available for the members of each sex by the
numbers of male or female participants in the athletic program and comparing
the results.”38 They would likely find an institution to be compliant “if this
comparison results in substantially equal amounts or if a resulting disparity can
be explained by adjustments to take into account legitimate, nondiscriminatory
factors.”39 One example of such a factor, which reflects the Javits Amendment’s
acknowledgement of reasonable differences between sports, is the higher cost

32. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (2020).
33. Id.
34. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)(1).
35. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 12, at 71413.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 71414.
38. Id. at 71415.
39. Id.
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of nonresident tuition at state universities, which “may in some years be
unevenly distributed between men’s and women’s [teams].”40 Another example
is “spreading scholarships over as much as a full generation (four years) of
student athletes” when building a newly established team.41 Doing so “may
result in the award of fewer scholarships in the first few years than would be
necessary to create proportionality between male and female athletes.”42
The financial assistance regulation “does not require a proportionate
number of scholarships for men and women or individual scholarships of equal
dollar value.”43 Instead, “the total amount of scholarship aid made available to
men and women must be substantially proportionate to their participation
rates.”44 Put simply, if women are forty-five percent of the athletes at a
particular institution, they should receive forty-five percent of the athletic
scholarship dollars or thereabouts.
The Policy Interpretation expanded “Other Athletic Benefits and
Opportunities” to include not only the ten components of the laundry list, but
also “recruitment of student athletes and provision of support services.”45
Compliance would be assessed “by comparing the availability, quality and kinds
of benefits, opportunities, and treatment afforded members of both sexes.”46
Institutions need not provide identical benefits, opportunities, or treatment to
male and female athletes, so long as “the overall effects” of any differences are
“negligible.”47
Specific comparisons would be made regarding the ten laundry-list factors
plus recruiting and support services. For example, regarding factor number
two—equipment and supplies—regulators would compare the quality, amount,
suitability, maintenance and repair, and availability of equipment and supplies
for men’s and women’s teams.48 Similar comparisons would be made for the
remaining laundry-list factors to assess compliance with Title IX.49
To assess gender equity in the recruitment of athletes, regulators would
consider whether: (1) coaches of men’s and women’s teams “are provided with

40. Id. But in the same section, the Policy Interpretation cautions that such differences would only
be considered nondiscriminatory “if they are not the result of policies or practices which
disproportionately limit the availability of out-of-state scholarships to either men or women.”
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 71416.
49. Id. at 71416–71417.
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substantially equal opportunities to recruit,” (2) the financial and other resources
available for recruiting male and female athletes “are equivalently adequate to
meet the needs of each program”; and (3) the differences in benefits,
opportunities, and treatment given to recruited athletes of each sex “have a
disproportionately limiting effect upon the recruitment of students of either
sex.”50 An assessment of gender equity in support services would consider the
equivalence in “the amount of administrative assistance provided to men’s and
women’s programs” and in “the amount of secretarial and clerical assistance
provided to men’s and women’s programs.”51
The Policy Interpretation then addresses the effective accommodation of
student interests and abilities. It requires institutions to provide “both the
opportunity for individuals of each sex to participate in intercollegiate
competition, and for athletes of each sex to have competitive team schedules
which equally reflect their abilities.”52 To determine compliance, regulators
will evaluate: (1) “whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for
male and female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate
to their respective enrollments; or (2) assuming one sex has been and remains
underrepresented among an institution’s intercollegiate athletes, “whether the
institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion
which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the
members of that sex”; or (3) when the members of one sex are underrepresented
among the intercollegiate athletes at an institution, whether the institution can
show that “the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully
and effectively accommodated by the present program.”53 In subsequent
litigation, this “three-part test” would become the key metric by which federal
courts would measure the institutional defendant’s compliance, or lack thereof,
with Title IX.54
In 1979, though, the three-part test had not yet become the key to
compliance, so the more narrowly focused two-part test for assessing levels of
competition for men and women that accompanied it received equal billing in
the Policy Interpretation. The latter requires regulators to consider whether: (1)
“the competitive schedules for men’s and women’s teams, on a program-wide

50. Id. at 71417.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 71418.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 71414. Parts two and three of the three-part test are the “exceptions” to the substantialproportionality standard cited in note 13. Because they are alternative means of complying with Title
IX, the data that institutions provide under the EADA are not a clear measure of Title IX compliance.
The data may suggest noncompliance with part one, but the institution could still comply under part
two or part three, each of which is less amenable to numerical measures than part one.
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basis, afford proportionally similar numbers of male and female athletes
equivalently advanced competitive opportunities” or (2) “the institution can
demonstrate a history and continuing practice of upgrading the competitive
opportunities available to the historically disadvantaged sex as warranted by the
developing abilities among the athletes of that sex.”55
The Policy Interpretation marked a change in the process by which Title IX
regulations were promulgated. One commentator has noted that “1975 was the
last time that [federal regulators] sent a major Title IX regulation to the president
for his signature.”56
Beginning with the Policy Interpretation, the
communications to institutions about Title IX athletics rules came via
“interpretations,” “clarifications,” and “guidance” documents; in recent years,
these communications have taken the form of “Dear Colleague” letters, which
have announced major policy decisions on several occasions.57 Because these
documents were not the products of formal rulemaking, they lack the force of
law, although, as Part II will show, courts have accorded them “substantial
deference” in lawsuits challenging the legality of the proportionality standard
for enforcing Title IX.58
C. The 1980s: Lax Title IX Enforcement
The Policy Interpretation was the work of HEW, but in 1980, just a year
after the Policy Interpretation’s release, Congress split HEW, and the new
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) assumed
responsibility for Title IX enforcement, which it retains today.59 Despite the
presence of the Policy Interpretation, the federal government’s enforcement of
Title IX in the late 1970s and the 1980s was lax. Most institutions ignored the
July 1978 deadline for Title IX compliance and the increasing interest of women
in athletic competition, establishing few or no teams for women.60 Moreover,
for the next fifteen years, Title IX went largely unenforced, and institutions

55. Id. at 71418.
56. MELNICK, supra note 6, at 43.
57. Id.
58. Informal agency rulings, such as the Policy Interpretation, which do not result from notice-andcomment rulemaking, are not entitled to “considerable deference,” under Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But, like the Policy Interpretation, such rulings may receive “substantial
deference” from courts when those rulings interpret the agency’s own regulations, the language of the
regulations is ambiguous, and the informal ruling is “reasonable” and “sensibly conforms to the purpose
and wording of the regulations.” See Hefferan, Jr., supra note 29, at 595.
59. Brian L. Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title IX as Catalyst for an Alternative Model of
College Sports, 8 SETON HALL J. OF SPORT LAW 351, 356, n. 25 (1998). See also CARPENTER &
ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 254.
60. Expert Report of Donna A. Lopiano, Ph.D. at 33, Portz v. St. Cloud State Univ. No. 16-cv01115-JRT-LIB (Dist. Minn. Jan. 15, 2017) (on file with the author).
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became increasingly aware of the lack of federal oversight of their women’s
sports programs.61
Institutional intransigence was not the only reason for lax enforcement. A
primary cause was the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City College v. Bell,
which held that the word “program” in the opening section of Title IX referred
not to an entire institution, but instead, only to its subunit(s) that actually
received federal funds.62 Because college athletic departments do not receive
federal funds, after Grove City, women athletes had to rely on “institutional
goodwill” to ensure that they received equitable treatment from the athletic
director; Title IX no longer applied to institutional subunits that received no
federal funds.63
Sadly, institutional goodwill was in short supply. In the wake of the Grove
City decision, OCR closed twenty-three investigations of athletic programs.64
For much of the 1980s, then, “Title IX was off the table as a remedy for sex
discrimination in college and high school athletics.”65 Congress itself upended
the table in 1988 when it enacted The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 over
President Reagan’s veto, codifying the word “program” to mean an entire
institution (including the athletic department), not just a subunit that actually
receives federal funds.66 Still, as the 1990s began, Title IX enforcement
remained less than aggressive.67
D. The Clinton Era and the 1996 “Clarification”
The pace of enforcement quickened under President Clinton and Assistant
Secretary of Education for Civil Rights Norma Cantu. In 1996, OCR released
its first major Title IX enforcement document since the Policy Interpretation,
titled the “Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The ThreePart Test.”68 The Clarification takes the form of a “Dear Colleague” letter from
Assistant Secretary Cantu; the letter notes early on that it is “limited to an

61. Id.
62. 465 U.S. 555 (1984); see also CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 119.
63. See CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 121.
64. MELNICK, supra note 6, at 102.
65. Erin E. Buzuvis & Kristine E. Newhall, Equality Beyond the Three-Part Test: Exploring and
Explaining the Invisibility of Title IX’s Equal Treatment Requirement, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 427, 435
(2012).
66. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 126.
67. See WELCH SUGGS, A PLACE ON THE TEAM: THE TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY OF TITLE IX 128
(2005).
68. Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, U.S. DEPT. OF
EDUC., OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., (Jan. 16, 1996), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.ht
ml [hereinafter Clarification].
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elaboration of the “three-part test” first identified in the Policy Interpretation.69
It notes further that “institutions need to comply only with any one part of the
three-part test” to satisfy Title IX.70 Institutions that comply with the first part
of the test, known as “substantial proportionality,” have reached a “safe harbor”
of Title IX compliance.71
But an institution that cannot achieve substantial proportionality may still
comply by satisfying either part two or part three of the test. According to the
Clarification, part two—the “history and continuing practice” portion of the
test—examines “an institution’s good faith expansion of athletic opportunities
through its response to developing interests of the underrepresented sex” on
campus.72 Part three, which concerns “fully and effectively accommodating
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex,” asks whether “concrete and
viable interests among the underrepresented sex” exist and warrant
accommodation by the institution.73
Having identified the alternative pathways to Title IX compliance, the
Clarification proceeds to address several criticisms of the three-part test
expressed in comments that OCR had solicited regarding an earlier draft of the
document. One such criticism is that “the test improperly establishes arbitrary
quotas.”74 The Clarification rejects the “quota” charge because quotas only
exist (and are impermissible) when “opportunities are required to be created
without regard to sex.”75 For example, a system that limited the number of
Catholics, Jews, women, or Italian Americans who could be admitted to a 120member first-year law school class would be an impermissible quota. But, the
Clarification notes, “schools are permitted to create athletic participation
opportunities based on sex,” and, if “they do so unequally, that is a legitimate
measure of unequal opportunity under Title IX.”76 Thus, even if achieving
“substantial proportionality” were the only permissible means of complying
with Title IX, the quota charge would be, to use the Clarification’s word,
“misplaced.”77
The Clarification also rejects a suggestion by some that when determining
the number of participation opportunities an institution offers in sports, OCR
should count “unfilled slots,” meaning positions on a team that the institution
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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claims exist but that no athletes actually fill.78 According to the Clarification,
OCR must count only actual athletes when evaluating proportionality because
“participation opportunities must be real, not illusory.”79 Finally, the
Clarification responds to comments that revealed confusion about whether, to
achieve substantial proportionality between male and female athletes,
institutions can (or must) cap the size of or eliminate men’s teams. It explains
that to comply with part one of the three-part test, “an institution can choose to
eliminate or cap teams,”80 but “nothing in the Clarification requires that an
institution cap or eliminate participation opportunities for men.”81 And “cutting
or capping men’s teams will not help an institution comply with part two or part
three because these tests measure an institution’s positive, ongoing response to
the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex.”82
E. The Bowling Green Letter
The next major communication from OCR regarding the application of Title
IX to college sports was the “Dear Colleague Letter: Bowling Green State
University,” better known as the Bowling Green Letter, which was issued in
1998.83 The Letter emphasizes that under the Policy Interpretation, an
institution must ensure that “the total amount of scholarship aid made available
to men and women [is] substantially proportionate to their [overall]
participation rates” at the institution.84
Accordingly, if the percentage of an institution’s total athletic scholarship
budget that athletes of either sex receive is within one point of their sex’s share
of the total number of varsity athletes on campus, then a strong presumption
will exist that the disparity is reasonable and the institution complies with Title
IX regarding athletic scholarships.85 For example, “if men are 60% of the
athletes, OCR would expect that the men’s athletic scholarship budget would be
within 59%-61% of the total budget for athletic scholarships for all athletes,
after accounting for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for any larger
disparity.”86 Thus, institutions have one percentage point of wiggle room in

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Bowling
Green State University (July 23, 1998), www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/bowlgrn.html.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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either direction from their numbers of male and female athletes to achieve
substantial proportionality in athletic financial aid.
F. The George W. Bush Era: A Presidential Commission and a “Further
Clarification”
Guidance documents continued to flow from OCR after the George W.
Bush administration took office in 2001. The Bush administration sought to
make compliance with Title IX easier by enabling institutions to use the results
of their student surveys to show that existing institutional athletic programs
satisfied part three of the three-part test by effectively accommodating their
athletic interests and abilities.87 This intent reflected the opposition of
conservative Title IX critics to the substantial proportionality standard, which
the critics thought had caused the elimination of too many men’s teams.
Accordingly, President Bush’s Secretary of Education, Roderick Paige, formed
a Commission on Opportunity in Athletics in June 2002 to study the issues
surrounding Title IX compliance.88
The Commission’s report, called “Open to All: Title IX at Thirty,” included
twenty-three recommendations, fifteen of which were unanimous.89 Secretary
Paige announced that his department would “move forward” only on the
unanimous recommendations.90 Among the nonunanimous recommendations,
three are noteworthy. Recommendation 15 would have found an institution in
compliance with the proportionality standard if the numbers of “available slots”
for men and women on its respective teams were “proportional to the
male/female ratio in enrollment.”91 In other words, “[e]ven if the slots a
program makes available are not filled, the school could still be in compliance
with the first part of the three-part test.”92 The Minority Report, filed by
Commissioners Donna deVarona and Julie Foudy, pointed out that this
recommendation plainly contradicted the guidance that OCR had issued in
1996, namely, that “participation opportunities must be real, not illusory.”93 If
adopted, they wrote, it “would allow schools to artificially inflate the percentage
of athletic opportunities they give to women by counting opportunities they

87. MELNICK, supra note 6, at 90.
88. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 189.
89. U.S. Department of Education, Secretary’s Commission for Opportunity in Athletics, Open to
All: Title IX at Thirty 1 (2003), www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/title9report.pdf [hereinafter
Open to All].
90. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 191.
91. Open to All, supra note 89, at 37.
92. Id.
93. Report, Donna deVarona & Julie Foudy, Minority Views on the Report of the Commission on
Opportunity in Athletics, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 13 (2003).
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never actually fill or seek to fill.”94
Recommendation 17 would have excluded “walk-on” (neither recruited nor
scholarship recipient) athletes from the ratios of male and female athletes on
which the proportionality calculation is made. In other words, when numbers
of male and female athletes were compared to enrollment figures, walk-ons
would not be counted, as if they did not exist.95 The minority report charged
that this recommendation “would enable schools to pretend that they are not
giving athletics opportunities to men, and then to reduce their obligation to
female athletes accordingly, even though walk-ons receive the benefits of sports
participation, including coaching, training, tutoring, equipment and uniforms.”96
Recommendation 18 would have allowed institutions to “conduct
continuous interest surveys on a regular basis as a way of (1) demonstrating
compliance with the three-part test, (2) allowing schools to accurately predict
and reflect men’s and women’s interest in athletics over time, and (3)
stimulating student interest in varsity sports.”97 It directed the Department of
Education to “develop specific guidance on interest surveys and how these
surveys could establish compliance with the three-part test.”98 The minority
report responded that this recommendation “rests on the stereotyped notion that
women are inherently less interested in sports than men—a notion that
contradicts Title IX and fundamental principles of civil rights law.”99
Five months after Secretary Paige released Open to All, Assistant Secretary
for Civil Rights Gerald Reynolds issued a “Further Clarification” regarding
Title IX and college sports.100 Taking the form of a “Dear Colleague” letter
from Mr. Reynolds, it was anticlimactic. It specifically endorsed the three-part
test, noting that “[e]ach of the three prongs is . . . a valid, alternative way for
schools to comply with Title IX” and that “no one prong is favored.”101 If these
words were not a ringing endorsement of the substantial proportionality
standard, they were hardly a rejection of it either, much to the relief of Title IX
advocates. But as became evident with the issuance of an “Additional

94. Id. Readers of a certain age will remember deVarona and Foudy as Olympic gold medalists in
swimming (1964) and soccer (1996), respectively. Each woman participated in the Olympic Games
twice.
95. See Open to All, supra note 89, at 38.
96. deVarona & Foudy, supra note 93, at 13.
97. See Open to All, supra note 89, at 38.
98. Id.
99. See deVarona & Foudy, supra note 93, at 16.
100. Gerald Reynolds, Further Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding
Title IX Compliance, United States Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (Jul. 11, 2003),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/title9guidanceFinal.html.
101. Id.
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Clarification” in 2005, the Bush administration still wished to make Title IX
compliance easier for colleges and universities.102
G. The Bush Era, Act Two: An “Additional Clarification”
The new document expressed OCR’s belief that “institutions may benefit
from further specific guidance on part three.”103 It stated that an institution
would comply with part three unless one or more sports existed for the
underrepresented sex in which all of the following conditions were present: (1)
unmet interest sufficient to sustain a varsity team, (2) sufficient athletic ability
to sustain a team, and (3) a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition
for the team(s) within the institution’s normal competitive region.104
Accordingly, schools need not “accommodate the interests and abilities of all
their students or fulfill every request for the addition or elevation of particular
sports, unless all three conditions are present.”105 The document concluded by
observing that each part of the three-part test is “an equally sufficient” means of
complying with Title IX.106 To underscore this point, it added that, “[i]n
essence, each part . . . is a safe harbor.”107
Much criticism greeted the “Additional Clarification.” Critics assailed it
for accepting the use of email surveys as “the sole determinant” of women’s
interest in playing varsity sports, contrary to the 1996 “Clarification,” which
had included such surveys among several means of assessing unmet interest.108
Criticism also resulted from the document’s reference to “results that show
insufficient interest to support an additional varsity team for the
underrepresented sex” creating “a presumption of compliance with part three of
the three-part test….”109 According to one critic, this arrangement assigned “the
burden of proof” regarding unmet interest to the students instead of the

102. Additional Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test—Part Three, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (Mar. 17, 2005), www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
letters/200503017-additional-clarification-three-part-test.pdf [hereinafter Additional Clarification].
103. Id. at iii.
104. Id. at iv.
105. Id.
106. Id. at v.
107. Id.
108. Andrew Zimbalist, Bush Administration Uses Stealth Tactics to Subvert Title IX, in EQUAL
PLAY: TITLE IX AND SOCIAL CHANGE 283, 284 (Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Andrew Zimbalist eds.
2007). The other determinants of unmet interest included in the 1996 Clarification are (1) requests by
students and admitted students that a particular sport be added; (2) requests that an existing club sport
be elevated to varsity status; (3) participation in particular club or intramural sports; (4) interviews with
students, admitted students, coaches, administrators, and others regarding interest in particular sports;
and (5) participation in particular high school sports by admitted students.
109. See Additional Clarification, supra note 102, at iv.
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university.110 Another critic noted that limiting the pool of students surveyed to
existing undergraduates would underestimate unmet interest. For example, “a
university that does not offer women’s varsity ice hockey would be unlikely to
find survey evidence of enough interest and ability to field a varsity women’s
ice hockey team, since women who really wanted to play that sport likely would
have selected a different school.”111 As a result, part three has not become the
“safe harbor” that the Bush administration hoped it would be; indeed, the
Obama administration would rescind the Additional Clarification in 2010.112
H. The Obama Era: Aggressive Enforcement
The rescission came in a thirteen-page “Dear Colleague” letter signed by
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlyn Ali.113 Secretary Ali noted that
under part three of the Title IX standard, to determine unmet interest in a
particular sport, instead of relying solely on interest surveys, OCR would return
to evaluating the following factors identified in the 1996 Clarification:
(1) requests by students and admitted students that a particular
sport be added;
(2) requests for the elevation of an existing club sport to
intercollegiate status;
(3) participation in club or intramural sports;
(4) interviews with students, admitted students, coaches,
administrators, and others regarding interests in particular
sports;
(5) results of surveys or questionnaires of students and admitted
students regarding interests in particular sports;
(6) participation in interscholastic sports by admitted students;
and
(7) participation rates in sports in high schools, amateur athletic
associations, and community sports leagues that operate in
areas from which the institution draws its students.114
110. Zimbalist, supra note 108, at 284.
111. DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN’S SPORTS
REVOLUTION 221 (2010).
112. MELNICK, supra note 6, at 90.
113. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Oct. 26, 2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.html.
114. Clarification of the Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test, U.S. Dep’t
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Besides those factors, OCR would consider “intercollegiate competition for a
particular sport in the institution’s normal competitive region.”115
Secretary Ali then outlined a similarly comprehensive process for assessing
the ability to sustain a viable team and the likelihood of finding suitable
competition for that team. If the information the institution compiles during the
assessment process shows sufficient interest and ability to support a new
intercollegiate team and a reasonable expectation of competition against
suitable rivals in the institution’s normal competitive region, the institution must
“create a varsity team within a reasonable period of time” to satisfy part three.116
Thus, as of the spring of 2010, institutions could no longer demonstrate
compliance based on the results of interest surveys alone. After 2010, the focus
of OCR’s Title IX guidance documents shifted from athletics to sexual
harassment and sexual violence, both in the Obama administration and the
Trump administration.117 This trend continues in the Biden administration.118
That shift does not signal the achievement of gender equity in college sports,
though. Indeed, college women continue to file lawsuits charging their
institutions with violating Title IX by failing to establish new women’s teams
or by underfunding or eliminating existing teams.119 The influence of lawsuits
on the enforcement of Title IX in college sports is the subject of Part II, which
follows.

of Educ., Office for Civil Rights (Jan, 16, 1996), https://ww2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/docs/clarific.html.
115. Id.
116. Additional Clarification, supra note 102, at 10.
117. United States Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (2011)
refers to the Obama administration’s letter. It is available at www2.ed.gov/print/about/offices/list/ocr/
letters/colleague-201104.html. The Trump administration rescinded that letter in 2017, subsequently
promulgating new regulations governing sexual assault in May of 2020. See Greta Anderson, U.S.
Publishes New Regulations on Campus Sexual Assault, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 7, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/07/education-department-releases-final-title-ixregulations.
118. In March 2021, the Biden administration issued Executive Order 14021 ordering a review of
all Department of Education actions that “are or may be inconsistent with a guarantee of an educational
environment free from discrimination based on sex ….” Included in the review were the regulations
the Trump administration put in place in 2020. See Exec. Order No. 14,021, 86 C.F.R. 13803 (2021).
119. See discussion infra Part IID.
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II. LITIGATING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE
IX’S LANGUAGE AND REGULATIONS
A. Setting the Table: The Precursor Decisions
The Title IX college-sports litigation began in earnest after Congress
overrode President Reagan’s veto of the Civil Rights Restoration Act.120 The
litigation flowed from decisions by institutions to drop certain women’s sports
because of budgetary constraints.121 But those institutional decisions would
likely have gone unchallenged—at least in court—had not two Supreme Court
decisions facilitated legal challenges to gender inequity in college sports.122
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,123 the Supreme Court held Title IX
encompasses a private right of action that entitles a victim of sex discrimination
to sue an institution to enforce the statute’s prohibition against such
discrimination.124 In the second case, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools,125 also a Supreme Court decision, the Court concluded that lower
courts may require an educational institution found liable for intentional sex
discrimination “to pay a plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages besides
having to reform its noncomplying program(s)” to satisfy Title IX.126
Spurred by Cannon, Franklin, and the enactment of the Civil Rights
Restoration Act, college women brought several successful Title IX sportsrelated lawsuits in the federal courts during the 1990s. They are the focus of
Section B, below.
B. The Early Title IX College Sports Cases
In Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP), members of the
women’s field hockey and gymnastics teams challenged IUP’s decision to
disband both teams, winning a preliminary injunction that forced IUP to
reinstate them.127 Favia signaled future developments, notably the centrality of
the Policy Interpretation to judicial interpretations of Title IX. It was “the first
federal court decision to apply any provision of the Policy Interpretation to a
Title IX claim in the context of college sports.”128 It also put institutions on
120. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 126.
121. BRIAN L. PORTO, A NEW SEASON: USING TITLE IX TO REFORM COLLEGE SPORTS 151 (2003).
122. Id.
123. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
124. PORTO, supra note 121, at 151.
125. See 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
126. PORTO, supra note 121, at 151.
127. 7 F.3d 332, 344 (3d Cir. 1993).
128. Id.
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notice that they would not be able to defend themselves successfully against a
Title IX claim by pleading budgetary problems, the offering or disbanding of
equal numbers of men’s and women’s teams, or a lack of discriminatory
intent.129
Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture followed on the heels of
Favia.130 In Roberts, members of the softball team at Colorado State University
(CSU) filed suit after the institution dropped their sport; the trial court,
concluding that CSU had violated Title IX, issued a permanent injunction,
reinstating the team.131 CSU appealed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, relying
on the three-part test articulated by OCR in the Policy Interpretation.132 Roberts
was a milestone “because it established that the three-part test was the judicially
preferred measure of compliance with Title IX, that the plaintiff bore the
burdens of proof under parts one and three, and that the defendant bore the
burden of proof under part two.”133 It further established that a 10.5 percent gap
between female enrollment and female athletic participation, which would have
resulted from dropping the softball team, failed to meet part one of that test: the
substantial proportionality standard.134 Last but not least, it reinforced two
conclusions reached in Favia: (1) an institution could not use budgetary
constraints to escape accountability for violating Title IX, and (2) a plaintiff did
not have to prove discriminatory intent to show that the defendant institution
had violated the statute.135
Still, the most consequential of the early Title IX college sports cases was
Cohen v. Brown University, which resulted from Brown University’s 1991
decision to disband its women’s volleyball and gymnastics teams.136 In Cohen
I, the district court granted a request by the women volleyball players and
gymnasts for a preliminary injunction against Brown’s decision, restoring both
teams to varsity status.137 In Cohen II, the First Circuit affirmed, concluding
that the plaintiffs would likely win on the merits of their suit at trial.138 It then
129. Id.
130. See 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993). At the time of the litigation,
the Colorado State Board of Agriculture was the governing body of Colorado State University; hence,
it was the defendant in Roberts.
131. PORTO, supra note 121, at 152.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 153.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997).
Brown dropped its men’s golf and water polo teams and its women’s volleyball and gymnastics teams
simultaneously.
137. Id.
138. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 906 (1st Cir. 1993).
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remanded the case to the district court for a trial.139
In Cohen III, after a bench trial, the district court held that Brown had
violated Title IX and must submit a compliance plan.140 The district court later
rejected the plan, after which Brown appealed again, triggering Cohen IV.141
The First Circuit rejected Brown’s claim that its responsibility under
Title IX was just to provide for women athletic opportunities equal to their
current membership on varsity teams.142 According to the First Circuit, Brown’s
“relative interests” approach would “entrench and fix by law the significant
gender-based disparity in athletics opportunities found by the district court to
exist at Brown . . . .”143 That approach disregarded Title IX’s purpose to
overcome stereotypical conceptions of women’s athletic interests and abilities.
Athletic “interest and ability rarely develop in a vacuum,” the appellate court
noted; instead, “they evolve as a function of opportunity and experience.”144
Thus, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of Brown’s initial
plan and remanded again to the district court to give Brown another chance to
submit a compliance plan.145 Brown appealed to the Supreme Court, which
declined to hear the case.146 In 1998, the parties signed a consent decree
requiring Brown to maintain a 3.5 percent gap between the percentages of
women undergraduates and women athletes on campus.147

139. Id. at 907
140. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 214 (D.R.I. 1995).
141. 101 F.3d at 162.
142. Id. at 175.
143. Id. at 176.
144. Id. at 179.
145. Id. at 188.
146. 520 U.S. 1186.
147. Greta Anderson, Compliance Headache Turned PR Problem, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 1,
2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/09/01brown-emails-show-frustration-titleix-agreement. More recently, Brown cut additional teams, prompting a return to court and a new
agreement in the fall of 2020. Under the new settlement, Brown has agreed to reinstate its women’s
equestrian and fencing teams, maintain full support for those teams in the future, and not cut or reduce
the status of any women’s varsity team until at least 2024, during which time it must comply with the
terms of the 1998 agreement. In return, the consent decree will expire on August 31, 2024, although
Brown must ensure equal athletic opportunities thereafter. See Court Approves Settlement Restoring
Equal Opportunities for Women in Brown Univ. Athletics, ACLU RHODE ISLAND (Dec. 15, 2020, 9:00
AM), www.riaclu.org/news/post/court-preliminarily-approves-settlement-in-title-ix-lawsuit-against-br
own-u. In October 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the agreement
reached a year earlier, despite a claim by twelve athletes on Brown’s current women’s gymnastics and
ice hockey teams that the original plaintiffs, who attended Brown in the 1990s, no longer adequately
represent the class. Susan A. Greenberg, Brown U. and Female Former Athletes Resolve Title IX
Dispute, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/print/quicktakes/
2021/10/29/brown-u-and-female-former-athletes-resolve-title-ix-dispute; Katie Mulvaney, Appeals
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Even after Cohen, some observers still argued that “Title IX is an
affirmative action statute that requires gender-based preferences or quotas.”148
But the rule of Roberts and Cohen has been the law of the land since the mid1990s; to comply with Title IX, institutions must satisfy one part of the threepart test first articulated in the Policy Interpretation in 1979.149
C. Backlash: Title IX Suits by Male College Athletes
Favia, Roberts, and Cohen spawned lawsuits by male college athletes
against their respective institutions for having dropped certain men’s teams,
allegedly to satisfy the substantial proportionality standard. Illustrative of these
cases, which occurred between 1993 and 2002, was Gonyo v. Drake University.
The Gonyo court held that the institution’s decision to discontinue its wrestling
program was not sex discrimination in violation of Title IX because, even after
wrestling’s elimination, men accounted for 42.8 percent of the student body, but
75.3 percent of the varsity athletes at Drake.150 Therefore, Drake’s athletic
offerings effectively accommodated the interests and abilities of its male
students,151 and the court granted summary judgment for Drake.152 The lesson
of Gonyo is that “the termination of a men’s team signals no discrimination
when post termination participation ratios continue to favor males.”153 In cases
following Gonyo, male college athletes were similarly unsuccessful for the same
reason the Gonyo court cited.154

Court Upholds Settlement in Landmark Brown Gender-Equity Case, PROVIDENCE J. (Oct. 27, 2021),
https://www.providencejournal.com/story/news/courts/2021/10/27/appeals-court-upholds-settlementlandmark-brown-gender-equity-case/8551760002/.
148. PORTO, supra note 121, at 154–55.
149. Id. at 154.
150. 837 F. Supp. 989, 992 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
151. Id. at 995-96.
152. Id. at 996.
153. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 2, at 139.
154. See Kelley v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994) (decision to end
men’s swimming program while retaining women’s swimming program did not violate Title IX because
even afterwards, men’s participation in athletics was still more than substantially proportionate to their
presence in student body); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999) (elimination of
men’s soccer and wrestling programs did not violate Title IX because men’s participation in athletics
remained within three percentage points of their enrollment); Neal v. Bd. of Trustees of Cal. State
Univ., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999) (reduction in roster spots on wrestling team for males did not violate
Title IX because institutions may cut programs to make men’s and women’s athletic participation rates
substantially proportionate to their percentages in the undergraduate student body); Mia. Univ.
Wrestling Club v. Mia. Univ., 302 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2002) (equalization of athletic opportunities for
men and women by eliminating three men’s team sports did not violate Title IX, which focuses on
opportunities for the underrepresented gender and does not bestow rights on the historically
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The case that best illustrates Title IX’s jurisprudential victory over its
critics, though, is Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education, which
was litigated between 2007 and 2011.155 The plaintiff, known as Equity in
Athletics, Inc. (EIA), was a nonprofit corporation comprised of coaches, fans,
booster clubs, parents, save-our-sport groups, and alumni of several Virginia
universities, including James Madison University (JMU).156 EIA sought an
injunction to prevent JMU from eliminating seven men’s and three women’s
sports.157 In Equity I, the trial court considered and denied that motion.158
Before the athletic program downsizing, JMU fielded twenty-eight varsity
teams for an undergraduate student body that was 61 percent female and 39
percent male; the athletes, though, were 50.7 percent female and 49.3 percent
male.159 The restructuring plan sought to rebalance athletic participation to 61
percent female and 39 percent male, reflecting the undergraduate enrollment at
JMU.160
In Equity I, EIA’s amended complaint alleged, first, that the Policy
Interpretation’s three-part test authorized intentional discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of Title IX
itself.161 Second, it alleged that the three-part test and subsequent Clarifications
“unlawfully amended the Title IX regulations without the required notice and
comment rulemaking.”162 Third, it charged that the three-part test, subsequent
Clarifications, and Department of Education’s (DOE) Title IX regulations were
invalid because the President had not approved them.163 Finally, it alleged that
the JMU athletic cuts, in seeking to achieve proportionality, violated both Title
IX and the Constitution.164 The court rejected all four claims, then denied EIA’s
overrepresented gender); and Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002) (elimination of
wrestling program did not violate Title IX because a university may comply with Title IX by increasing
athletic opportunities for the underrepresented gender (women) or by decreasing athletic opportunities
for the overrepresented gender (men)).
155. See 504 F. Supp. 2d 88 (W.D. Va. 2007); 291 Fed. Appx. 517 (4th Cir. 2008); 675 F. Supp. 2d
660 (W.D. Va. 2009); 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011). In a previous case, Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n
v. Dep’t of Educ., which similarly challenged OCR’s enforcement of Title IX, both the trial court and
the appellate court had held that the plaintiff associations lacked standing because they could not show
that a victory in court would reestablish any discontinued teams. See 263 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2003);
366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
156. 504 F. Supp. 2d 88, 90.
157. Id. at 91.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 92.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 98.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 98–99.
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motion for a preliminary injunction.165
EIA appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
which affirmed in Equity II, noting that it was limited “to addressing only those
issues relevant to the denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction, a motion
addressed only against JMU.” 166 Therefore, the appellate court sidestepped the
legitimacy of the Policy Interpretation and focused instead on EIA’s claims of
intentional gender discrimination by JMU.167 It noted that “nearly every circuit
in the country has rejected challenges similar to EIA’s underlying complaint
against JMU, i.e., that JMU violated Title IX and the Constitution when it used
gender to determine which athletic programs to cut.”168 Based on this reasoning
and its view that JMU should chart its own athletic future, the appellate court
affirmed the denial of EIA’s request for injunctive relief.169
The case then returned to the trial court (Equity III), which considered the
defendants’ motions to dismiss and EIA’s motion for summary judgment; the
court granted the former and rejected the latter as moot.170 It rebuffed EIA’s
claim that the three-part test violates Title IX, observing that “courts have
uniformly held that Title IX ‘does not bar remedial actions designed to achieve
substantial proportionality between athletic rosters and student bodies.’”171 For
that reason and because EIA could not produce a contrary case, the trial court
agreed with the federal defendants that the three-part test comports with Title
IX.172
Furthermore, Title IX honors the Equal Protection Clause. The statute’s
purpose is to prohibit institutions from discriminating based on sex, and the
three-part test serves that end. The “limited consideration of sex” sometimes
necessary in the downsizing of college athletic programs does not violate the
Constitution.173 And “[c]ourts have consistently rejected EIA’s underlying
claim that equal opportunity under [§106.41] should be tied to expressed interest
rather than actual participation.”174
The trial court then denied EIA’s claim that the three-part test was invalid
because neither the Policy Interpretation nor the Clarifications had undergone

165. Id. at 91.
166. Equity in Athletics v. Dep’t of Educ., 291 Fed. Appx. 517, 522 (4th Cir. 2008).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 524.
169. Id.
170. 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (W.D. Va. 2009).
171. Id. at 670 (quoting Neal, 198 F.3d at 771).
172. Id. at 684.
173. Id. at 672 (quoting Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272).
174. Id. at 675 (quoting Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 291 Fed. Appx. 517, 523
(4th Cir. 2008)).

PORTO 32.1

2021]

1/10/22 12:49 PM

STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

283

notice-and-comment rulemaking. That requirement, the court reasoned, “does
not apply to ‘interpretive rules,’ which simply state what the administrative
agency thinks a statute means.”175 It only applies to ‘legislative rules,’ “which
create new rights, impose new obligations, or effect a change in existing law.”176
Because the Policy Interpretation and the Clarifications were HEW’s
interpretations of Title IX’s athletic regulations, notice-and-comment
rulemaking was unnecessary.
Finally, the Policy Interpretation was not invalid for lack of Presidential
approval because “the [Administrative Procedure Act] does not require
Presidential approval each and every time an agency issues interpretive
guidelines.”177 Thus, the trial court granted the federal defendants’ motions to
dismiss and dismissed EIA’s motion for summary judgment.178
The case ended with Equity IV, a return visit to the Fourth Circuit.179
Persuaded by the reasoning of the district court and of “sister circuits” in
previous cases,180 the appellate court affirmed the district court’s grant of the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.181 In so doing, it effectively quashed the
backlash against the Policy Interpretation, the three-part test, and particularly
part one of that test. Subsequent litigation would contest an institution’s
application of those guidelines, but not their legitimacy.
D. The Second Wave of Title IX Lawsuits
Amidst the backlash, female athletes continued to sue their institutions after
2000 for violating Title IX because the early cases, such as Favia, Roberts, and
Cohen, did not spur nationwide compliance with the three-part test.182 The most
consequential in the second wave of Title IX equal-opportunity cases is Biediger
v. Quinnipiac University, which began in a federal district court in Connecticut

175. Id. at 677 (quoting Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1340 (4th Cir. 1996)).
176. Id. (citing L.A. Closeout, Inc. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 513 F.3d 940, 941 (9th Cir. 2008)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 684.
179. 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 111.
182. See, e.g., Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 864 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that,
considering LSU’s undergraduate enrollment was fifty-one percent male and forty-nine percent female,
but varsity teams were seventy-one percent male and twenty-nine percent female, “LSU violated Title
IX by failing to accommodate effectively the interests and abilities of certain female students and that
its discrimination against these students was intentional”); Barrett v. W. Chester Univ. of Pa. of the
State Sys. of Higher Educ., No. CIV.A. 03-CV-4978 2003 WL 22803477 (E.D. Pa Nov. 12, 2003)
(granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction after concluding that the University violated
all parts of the three-part test).
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in 2010.183 In 2009 Quinnipiac eliminated its women’s volleyball, men’s golf,
and men’s outdoor track teams and sought to create a competitive cheerleading
team for the 2009-10 school year.184 Five volleyball players and their coach
sued the university, alleging that their team’s elimination violated Title IX.185
In Biediger I, the court, after a bench trial, concluded that Quinnipiac indeed
violated Title IX when allocating athletic participation opportunities in 200910.186 During that year, Quinnipiac’s undergraduate population was 61.87
percent female (3,518 women) and 38.13 percent male (2,168 men); because
women were 62.27 percent and men were 37.73 percent of the varsity athletes,
the university appeared to satisfy the substantial-proportionality standard.187
But Quinnipiac inflated the number of its female athletes by conditioning
participation in women’s cross-country on participation in indoor and outdoor
track too.188 Complicating matters was Quinnipiac’s decision to create the
competitive cheerleading team and to assign it an initial roster target of thirty
participants.189 Accordingly, Biediger I considered two issues rarely, if ever,
litigated in previous Title IX litigation: (1) whether a university-sponsored
varsity activity—cheerleading in this instance—can be treated as a sport for
Title IX purposes, and (2) whether a varsity team qualifies as a genuine
participation opportunity.190
To determine whether competitive cheerleading qualified as a sport, the
court referred to a 2008 “Dear Colleague” Letter, issued by OCR, which
identified several factors that OCR considers when determining whether a
particular activity is a sport, including its “structure, administration, team
preparation and competition.”191 The following elements prompted the district
court to conclude that the competitive cheerleading team could not qualify as a
“sport” under Title IX:
(1) Its coach was not permitted to recruit athletes off campus;
(2) Its regular season featured different competitions governed

183. 728 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Conn. 2010).
184. Id. at 63.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 64—65.
188. Id. at 78.
189. Id. at 80-81.
190. Id. at 94.
191. Stephanie Monroe, Dear Colleague Letter: Athletic Activities Counted for Title IX Compliance,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (Sept. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Athletic Activities Dear
Colleague Letter], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20080917.html.
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by varying rules and a varying quality of opponents;
(3) Its postseason was an open invitational without any preevent winnowing or elimination of teams; and
(4) Its athletes received no locker space from Quinnipiac and
no insurance from the NCAA.192
The court held that “Quinnipiac may not yet count the members of its
competitive cheer team in order to prove its compliance with Title IX.”193
Moving to the second issue—whether all athletic participation opportunities
at Quinnipiac were genuine—the court reasoned that not all of the women cross
country runners who also participated in indoor and outdoor track enjoyed
genuine participation opportunities because they were required to compete in
indoor and outdoor track as a condition of running cross-country.194 Some of
these athletes were injured or were “redshirts” who sit out a season, often to
improve their skills or gain strength through physical maturation; their inclusion
added to the roster sizes of the indoor and outdoor track teams without offering
a genuine athletic experience.195
Thus, the trial court removed from Quinnipiac’s cadre of female athletes
thirty competitive cheerleaders and eleven cross-country runners who were
unable or ineligible to compete in indoor and outdoor track in 2009-10.196 The
result was that Quinnipiac had 233 female athletes and 167 male athletes on the
first day of competition that year, making women 61.87 percent of the
undergraduates and 58.25 percent of the varsity athletes and creating a disparity
of 3.62 percent.197 At issue was whether the 3.62 percent disparity—which
equated to a shortfall of thirty-eight women athletes—reflected an unmet
demand for a new varsity team.198
The court’s answer was yes because the median size of Quinnipiac’s
women’s teams in 2009-10 was twenty-four, and the women’s volleyball team,
which had been eliminated, required only fourteen players.199 Accordingly,
Quinnipiac had violated Title IX in 2009-10 by failing to offer equal athletic

192. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 99-100.
193. Id. at 101.
194. Id. at 107.
195. Id. See also Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 67, n.2 (providing an excellent description of the
practice of redshirting).
196. Id. at 111.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 112.
199. Id.
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opportunities to its women students.200 Thus, the district court permanently
enjoined Quinnipiac from denying its female students athletic opportunities and
ordered it to submit a Title IX compliance plan within sixty days.201
Quinnipiac appealed, challenging the trial court’s exclusion of roster slots
in women’s indoor and outdoor track and in competitive cheerleading, plus its
conclusion that a 3.62 percent disparity between female enrollment and athletic
participation violated Title IX.202 The appellate court noted that OCR requires
athletic participation opportunities to be offered in the context of a “sport.”203
Acknowledging that “with better organization and defined rules,” cheerleading
“might someday warrant recognition as a varsity sport,” the appellate panel
nevertheless concluded: “‘that time has not yet arrived.’”204
The appellate court then observed that the number of athletes listed on the
rosters of the indoor and outdoor track teams “were not reflective of genuine
participation opportunities in these sports, but were inflated to support mandated
year-round training for the 18 members of the women’s cross-country team.”205
Finally, the appellate panel noted that the 3.62 percent disparity between women
undergraduates and women athletes was a direct result of Quinnipiac’s athletic
choices and could be easily remedied by creating more athletic opportunities for
women.206 Thus, it affirmed the district court’s injunction order.207
The parties returned to the trial court in 2013 when Quinnipiac moved to
lift the injunction order.208 In the meantime, the institution had added women’s
golf and rugby teams, developed competitive cheerleading further, and ceased
requiring women cross-country runners to participate in indoor and outdoor
track.209 To obtain relief from the injunction order under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(5), Quinnipiac had to show that continued enforcement was
inequitable because of significantly changed circumstances, meaning genuine
compliance with Title IX, now and for the foreseeable future.210 The court
would apply the familiar three-part test and then the two-question “levels-of-

200. Id. at 113.
201. Id. at 114.
202. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2012).
203. Id. at 93 (citing Clarification, supra note 68, at 2-3).
204. Id. at 105.
205. Id. at 100.
206. Id. at 108.
207. Id.
208. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 928 F. Supp. 2d 414, 419 (2013).
209. Id. at 420.
210. Id. at 434—35.
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competition” test.211
The levels-of-competition test, though “seldom used today and rarely if ever
litigated,”212 was relevant here because to be relieved of the injunction,
Quinnipiac not only had to achieve substantial proportionality, but also show
that “its athletic program offers genuine varsity participation opportunities, and
equivalent athletic competition, for its female population.”213
But competitive cheerleading still could not qualify as a varsity sport;
besides lacking NCAA recognition, competitive cheerleading had tumbled into
a feud of late between the activity’s rival progeny, “Acro” and “STUNT,”
making the prospects for becoming an NCAA sport even dimmer than before.214
As a result, the district court concluded that “Quinnipiac’s acro program cannot
be considered—at least not at this stage in its development—an intercollegiatelevel varsity ‘sport’ under Title IX.”215 The new women’s rugby team was
problematic too. The lack of varsity rivals in Quinnipiac’s traditional
competitive region meant that most of the team’s competitors were club teams;
hence, Quinnipiac failed the “levels-of-competition” test.216
Therefore, the district court removed a total of sixty-seven women,
including thirty-six acro athletes, twenty-eight rugby players, and three indoortrack runners who had quit the team less than halfway through the regular season
and had not competed in one indoor-track event from Quinnipiac’s tally of
female athletes during 2011-12.217 Consequently, in 2011-12, the count of
female athletes at Quinnipiac was reduced to 254, which equated to 60.2 percent
of the total number of athletes there, as compared to the 62.4 percent of
Quinnipiac undergraduates who were women.218 Thus, a 2.2 percent disparity
existed between female undergraduates and female athletes.219 Although that
number was small, it represented a shortfall of approximately twenty-five
athletes, a number that “would almost certainly be enough to sustain a new,

211. Id. at 437. Recall from Part I that the “levels-of-competition” test considers: (1) whether the
competitive schedules for men’s and women’s teams, on a program-wide basis, afford proportionally
similar numbers of male and female athletes equivalently advanced competitive opportunities or (2)
whether the institution can demonstrate a history and continuing practice of upgrading the competitive
opportunities available to the historically disadvantaged sex as warranted by developing abilities of that
sex. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
212. Biediger, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
213. Id. at 452.
214. Id. at 424. Acro and STUNT each sponsored its own national championship separate from the
other. Id. at 424, n.13.
215. Id. at 458.
216. Id. at 461.
217. Id. at 466.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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independent varsity team.”220
Quinnipiac therefore failed both the substantial proportionality test and the
levels-of-competition test, prompting the district court to deny Quinnipiac’s
motion to lift the injunction.221 Thereafter, the parties reached a settlement
whereby Quinnipiac agreed to retain its existing women’s teams, including
volleyball, allocate more athletic scholarships to women, and improve the
benefits provided to women’s teams.222
Biediger is noteworthy for three reasons. First, the district court’s 2010
decision applied for the first time OCR’s test of whether a sponsored varsity
activity qualified as a sport for Title IX purposes. Second, that court’s 2013
decision applied the rarely litigated levels-of-competition test because the
authenticity of certain “athletic opportunities” was in question. Third and most
importantly, the same decision admonished Quinnipiac (and colleges generally)
to listen to students when contemplating new teams instead of selecting specific
teams “for economic or strategic reasons,” including the large roster sizes those
teams can support.223 The admonition was timely because, as Part III will show,
the manipulation of rosters to appear compliant with Title IX is rampant in
college sports.
E. The Saga Continues: Pending Litigation
Despite the caselaw discussed above, institutional failures to satisfy Title
IX continue to spawn litigation by college women seeking to revive teams that
their schools have eliminated or to establish new teams to address an unmet
demand for athletic opportunities. At this writing, late in the autumn of 2021,
five such cases are in various stages of the judicial process.224 The persistent
220. Id. at 467. The calculation regarding substantial proportionality was as follows: Quinnipiac
had 168 male athletes. For them to represent 37.6 percent of the varsity athletes (equivalent to their
percentage of the student body), the total number of athletes would have to be 447, of whom 279 were
women. The difference between the exactly proportional number of 279 women athletes and the 254
then countable for Title IX purposes was twenty- five. Id. at 467, n. 61.
221. Id. at 473.
222. Hefferan, Jr., supra note 29, at 662.
223. Id. at 663.
224. See, e.g., Anders v. Ca. State Univ., Fresno, 2021 WL 3115687 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (plaintiffs
challenge University’s decision to eliminate women’s lacrosse team; trial court denied defendants’
motion to dismiss); Balow v. Mich. State Univ., 2021 WL 4316771 (W.D. Mich.) (class action alleging
that the University’s elimination of women’s swimming and diving team violated Title IX because the
University does not satisfy any part of the three-part test; plaintiffs sought preliminary injunction
prohibiting elimination of the women’s swimming and diving program, which the trial court denied;
the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint regarding financial
assistance to athletes and the allocation of athletic benefits but denied that motion regarding plaintiffs’
claim of unequal participation opportunities, although his claim survives against only the University

PORTO 32.1

2021]

1/10/22 12:49 PM

STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

289

litigation of effective-accommodation issues under Title IX after nearly fifty
years underscores the need to investigate why institutions still fail to meet the
athletic interests and abilities of their female undergraduates. That task is the
business of Part III, which follows.
III. STILL SEEKING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN
ENFORCING TITLE IX
A. Failure to Enforce Substantial Proportionality
College women still have fewer athletic opportunities than they are entitled
to under the substantial-proportionality standard.225 Although women are now
forty-four percent of the athletes—a clear improvement over 1972-73 (fifteen
percent)—they are also fifty-six percent of the undergraduates at NCAAmember institutions; hence, they are still shortchanged regarding athletic
opportunities.226
Perhaps the easiest way to grasp how women are shortchanged in college
athletics is to consider how “proportionality math” works at the level of the
individual institution. Assume that the institution is a small liberal arts college
with 1,485 students—734 men and 751 women—making the women 50.6

and its Board of Trustees, not against individual defendants); Berndsen v. N.D. Univ. Sys., 7 F.4th 782
(8th Cir. 2021) (arising from defendants’ elimination of the women’s ice hockey team in 2017; the trial
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, 395 F. Supp. 3d 1194 (D.N.D. 2019), and the plaintiffs
appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which reversed and remanded the case to the trial court); Niblock v.
Univ. of Ky., 2020 WL 7028707 (E.D.KY.) (a class action seeking to require the University to increase
varsity athletic opportunities for women students, provide them with all corresponding benefits of
varsity status, increase athletic scholarships for women, and award monetary damages to the named
plaintiff, who has graduated; defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted on 11/30/20 as to two of named
plaintiff’s equal-protection claims, but denied as to her Title IX claims); Portz v. St. Cloud State
University, 16 F.4th 577 (8th Cir. 2021) (after a bench trial, the trial court ordered the University to
improve athletic opportunities for women and its treatment of women athletes, 401 F. Supp. 3d 834 (D.
Minn. 2019). The University appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed in part and reversed in part
and remanded, agreeing with the trial court that the University did not provide equal participation
opportunities, but reversing the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs did not receive equal treatment
and benefits). Two other recent Title IX suits against universities by women athletes, Keesing v. Bd. of
Trustees of Stanford Univ. and Ohlensehlen v. Univ. of Iowa, were settled in 2021. See Chris Burt, 5
Student-Athletes, Stanford Reach Settlement Over Title IX Lawsuit, UNIVERSITY BUSINESS (Aug. 27,
2021), http://universitybusiness.com/5-student-athletes-stanford-reach-settlement-over-title-ix-lawsuit
/; Chloe Peterson, University of Iowa, Women’s Swimmers Reach Settlement in Title IX Lawsuit, DAILY
IOWAN (Oct. 7, 2021), dailyiowan.com/2021/10/07/university-of-iowa-women’s-swimmers-reachsettlerment-in-title-ix-lawsuit/.
225. See Donna Lopiano, Gender Equity in Sports: It’s Not What You Think—2019 Quick Primer
13 (on file with the author).
226. Id.
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percent of the student body and the men 49.4 percent.227 But women are only
44.4 percent of the athletes (272 total), whereas men are 55.6 percent of the
athletes (340 total), meaning that a gap of 6.2 percent separates the percentages
of women athletes and women undergraduates, respectively.228 To determine
whether that gap signals a Title IX violation, assume that the 340 male-athlete
total equals the 49.4 percent male share of the student body, in which case the
number of athletes (male and female) at the institution should be 688 (340
divided by .494). Then subtract from 688 the number of athletic-participation
opportunities actually provided (340+272=612); the difference between the 688
slots that Title IX requires and the 612 actually provided is seventy-six, meaning
that if proportionality is to be achieved, the women are entitled to seventy-six
additional participation opportunities.229 Because seventy-six participation
opportunities would encompass several teams, the institution will likely be
required to establish one or more new women’s teams, although it may also
eliminate one or more men’s teams, increase the roster sizes of existing
women’s teams, decrease the roster sizes of existing men’s teams, or some
combination thereof, to achieve proportionality.230
Thus, the size of the gap between the percentage of the student body and
the percentage of athletes who belong to the underrepresented sex does not
determine whether an institution has achieved substantial proportionality.
Instead, the determinative figure is the difference between the number of
participation opportunities each sex would enjoy if proportionality were
achieved and the number of such opportunities the underrepresented sex
actually enjoys. If that number is smaller than the size of a new team the
institution does not currently offer, Title IX is satisfied, but if it is larger than
the size of a new team, the unmet need must be met by one or more of the
methods described above.231
Institutional failure to satisfy not just the proportionality standard, but all
parts of the three-part test of Title IX compliance, also exists at the athleticconference level, as an example will show. Consider the wealthy and

227. Donna Lopiano, Monitoring Athletics Title IX Compliance, 2018 Association of Title IX
Administrators (ATIXA) Annual Conference, Philadelphia, PA, October 10, 2018 (on file with the
author).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Professor Deborah Brake has noted: “[A]s long as men have a disproportionately large share
of the opportunities to play sports, cuts to men’s teams, whether for financial reasons or in the name of
moving toward gender equity, do not discriminate against men on the basis of sex.” BRAKE, supra note
111, at 84.
231. Nancy Hogshead-Makar and Amy Poyer, Legal Memo, Title IX Athletic Department
Compliance to Amy Huchthausen, Commissioner, America East Conference 3 (June 26, 2020) (on file
with the author).
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prestigious Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), whose fifteen members sponsor
some of the most storied athletic programs in the United States and have
produced successful and much-publicized football and men’s and women’s
basketball teams.232 Only one member—the University of Miami—can satisfy
part one of the three-part test; the remaining members all need to provide
additional athletic opportunities for women to achieve substantial
proportionality.233 No ACC-member institution can satisfy either part two or
part three of the three-part test.234
Thus, the persistence of litigation seeking equitable participation
opportunities for women in college sports almost fifty years after the passage of
Title IX is no surprise. Despite the tremendous growth over time in the number
of those opportunities, gender equity remains the exception, not the rule, in
college sports.235
B. The Use of Title IX as a Scapegoat for Financial Mismanagement
Some institutions seek to deflect criticism for their failure to comply with
Title IX by blaming the statute for the deficits in their athletic budgets instead
of facing their own profligate spending on football and men’s basketball. A
2017 report by the NCAA notes that in 2015-16, the sixty-five institutions that
belong to the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS)—the most athletically
ambitious component of college football—spent an average of eighty percent of

232. The members of the Atlantic Coast Conference are Boston College, Clemson University, Duke
University, Florida State University, Georgia Tech, North Carolina State University, Syracuse
University, The University of Louisville, The University of Miami, The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, The University of Notre Dame, The University of Pittsburgh, The University of Virginia,
Virginia Tech, and Wake Forest University. See generally ATLANTIC COAST CONFERENCE 2019-2020
ANNUAL REPORT.
233. Memorandum from Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Amy Poyer, Title IX Athletic Department
Compliance to John Swofford, Commissioner, Atlantic Coast Conference 3 (June 5, 2020).
234. Id. at 5.
235. STAUROWSKY ET AL., supra note 9, at 65; see Alan Blinder, Jere’ Longman & Gillian R.
Brassil, Womenʼs Basketball Is a Renewed Flashpoint for an Embattled N.C.A.A,. N.Y. TIMES (April
4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/04/sports/ncaabasketball/womensbasketball-ncaa-tourn
ament.html. The 2021 NCAA Women’s Basketball Tournament underscored the continuing gender
inequity in college sports when a female basketball player posted online photographs of the
dramatically unequal training facilities at the men’s and women’s venues. The pictures prompted the
NCAA to apologize and hire a law firm to investigate the Association’s conduct of championship events
with respect to gender equity. The report concluded unequal treatment results from the NCAA’s
organizational structure, media contracts, and revenue-distribution model, all of which prioritize men’s
basketball. It recommended numerous changes, including holding the men’s and women’s basketball
tournaments together in the same city to ensure that men and women athletes have comparable
championship experiences. The investigative report the NCAA requested is available at
https://ncaagenderequityreview.com.
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their men’s athletic budgets on just football and basketball.236 The FBS
institutions also had the largest gap of all three NCAA divisions between
expenditures for men’s and women’s athletics, except for scholarships.237 Not
surprisingly, the NCAA report found that Division III, whose members are
small private colleges and smaller state universities that do not award athletic
scholarships, provides the most equitable spending on men’s and women’s
sports.238
Overspending on men’s sports—notably football—is not confined to FBS
institutions, either, as the now-familiar case of James Madison University
(JMU) illustrates. Recall that in 2006, JMU announced plans to disband ten
athletic teams, ostensibly to comply with Title IX.239
The authors of a study of the athletic cuts at JMU specified that the
scapegoating of Title IX was a major factor in their choice of subject. They
explained that “JMU officials represented the decision to cut programs as
motivated by Title IX while selectively failing to disclose that during the same
period, greater institutional resources were being devoted to the football
program in preparation for playing in a more competitive conference.”240 The
announcement of the cuts coincided with JMU’s planned move to the Colonial
Athletic Association, in which “the level of competition in the sport of football
was going to demand an even greater financial commitment to the football
program to remain competitive.”241
Also in the works at the time of the cuts was “a new athletics performance
center with locker rooms and office space for the football team,” which required
“2.8 million to be drawn from institutional reserves and other nontax
sources.”242 Besides these factors, several others—including expansion of the
football roster from 102 to 142 players and a campaign to expand and renovate
the football stadium—suggested that the actions taken by JMU administrators
236. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 45 Years of Title IX: The Status of Women in
Intercollegiate Athletics 26 (2017), https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/TitleIX45.pdf
237. Id. at 29.
238. Id. at 31.
239. See Equity in Athletics v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88 (W.D. Va. 2007), discussed
in Part II, supra.
240. Ellen J. Staurowsky et al., Revisiting James Madison University: A Case Analysis of Program
Restructuring Following So-Called Title IX Cuts, 6 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 96, 97 (2013).
241. Id. at 102. The authors identified JMU’s conference as the Colonial Athletic Conference, but
the group’s official website identifies it as the Colonial Athletic Association, so this article uses the
latter term. Besides JMU, the football-playing members of the Colonial Athletic Association include
Albany, Delaware, Elon, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Richmond, Stony Brook, Villanova,
and William & Mary. See COLONIAL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, http://www.caasports.com (last visited
Nov. 21, 2021).
242. Staurowsky et al., supra note 240, at 102.
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“at the time of the cuts and in the years that followed had little to do with Title
IX and far more to do with an institutional desire to compete at a very high level
in a number of sports, most particularly football.”243
C. The Manipulation of Roster Sizes
The Biediger case discussed in Part II highlights another unsavory practice
related to Title IX: the manipulation of rosters to suggest that an institution has
more female varsity athletes than it does.244 The New York Times observed in
2011 that “as women have surged into a majority on campus in recent years,
many institutions have resorted to subterfuge to make it look as if they are
offering more spots to women.”245 To achieve substantial proportionality while
maintaining a football team of one hundred or more men means adding between
two and four sports for women, a considerable expense.246 To avoid that
expense, in the late 1990s, many colleges instituted “roster management,”
reducing the number of male participants allowed on existing men’s teams,
except, usually, football and men’s basketball. Roster management increased
the percentage, if not the number, of women varsity athletes in an institution’s
annual EADA report and it improved institutional prospects for achieving
proportionality.247
But roster management is susceptible to manipulation and deception.
OCR’s 1996 “Clarification” states that “participation opportunities must be real,
not illusory.”248 At Quinnipiac, though, men were cut from official rosters
shortly before the first competition of the season, which is when roster sizes are
set for EADA reporting purposes, then added later, when the reporting deadline
had passed.249 Conversely, target numbers for women’s rosters were inflated,
sometimes above what the budget and the coaching staff could support. Some
coaches added women who would have been cut ordinarily, counted them as
participants on the date of the first competition, then cut them thereafter or
allowed them to stay, but denied them an “authentic athletic experience”
because they were not skilled enough to compete.250
The manipulation of roster numbers is particularly prevalent in women’s

243. Id. at 111.
244. See Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 108.
245. Katie Thomas, College Teams, Relying on Deception, Undermine Gender Equity,” N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2011), nytimes.com/2011/04/26/sports/26titleix.html.
246. Lopiano, supra note 225, Exhibit 5.
247. Id.
248. See Clarification, supra note 68, at 3.
249. BRAKE, supra note 111, at 125.
250. Id.
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rowing, a sport Quinnipiac did not sponsor. Rosters of “between 60 and 100
participants [with] half the team rowing in novice boats (first-year rowers, the
equivalent of a freshman team)” are commonplace.251 The other half of the
team—experienced rowers—competes in four- and eight-person boats in varsity
competition. The novices, and sometimes the lightweight crews too, only row
on an exhibition basis, not in regular competition that counts for team
standings.252 But the sponsoring institutions can report ostensibly high female
participation numbers for EADA purposes.
To make matters worse, EADA promotes roster manipulation in two ways.
First, it counts team members for reporting purposes “as of the day of the first
scheduled contest for the team,” which encourages coaches to begin the season
with an inflated roster, then reduce its size dramatically after the reporting
deadline passes or to retain athletes who will not have a chance to compete.253
Second, the instructions for EADA data collection published by the Department
of Education permit institutions to count as women athletes for reporting
purposes “male practice players” who practice regularly with women’s teams,
most often in basketball and soccer.254 Besides violating the letter and the spirit
of Title IX, roster manipulation—enabled by EADA rules—sends a cynical
message to college students that phony posturing—not good-faith
compliance—is the proper response to a federal civil-rights law.
D. Coaches’ Ignorance About Title IX
Closely related to institutional noncompliance with Title IX is coaches’
ignorance about its requirements. Using data gathered in 2009 and 2010, a
social-science study of “Title IX literacy” asked nearly 1,100 college and
university coaches five questions designed to measure their basic knowledge of
Title IX.255 The questions concerned: the three-part test, whether Title IX is a
quota system, whether Title IX governs money generated by sports boosters,
how substantial proportionality is calculated, and whether—to satisfy Title
IX—"the percent of scholarship assistance offered to female athletes should be

251. GURNEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 161.
252. Id.
253. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g)(1)(B)(i).
254. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, User’s Guide for the Equity in
Athletics Act Web-Based Data Collection 28 (2020) (on file with the author). For example, in the
pending Title IX suit against the University of Iowa, the trial court noted that in 2018-19, the University
reported 409 female athletes for EADA purposes, fifteen of whom were male practice players, “ten in
women’s basketball, four in women’s soccer, and one in women’s volleyball.” Ohlensehlen v. Univ. of
Iowa, 509 F.Supp. 3d 1085 (S.D.Iowa 2020).
255. Ellen J. Staurowsky & Erianne A. Weight, Title IX Literacy: What Coaches Don’t Know and
Need to Find Out, 4 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 190 (2011).
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within one percent of their representation within the athlete population.”256 The
majority of the respondents answered fewer than fifty percent of the questions
correctly, leading the authors to conclude that had they been graded using a
traditional scale, “most coaches would receive an F on basic Title IX
literacy.”257 A subsequent question asked: “Does your institution have a
designated Title IX coordinator?” Just over a third of the respondents (31.4
percent) answered “Yes,” but 42.8 percent indicated that they were “not
sure.”258
Despite such evident ignorance of Title IX and its implications for their
work, nearly seventy-nine percent of the coaches surveyed responded
affirmatively to the question whether they believed their respective institutions
complied with Title IX.259 This incongruity prompted the study’s authors to
ask: On what basis would they be able to make such a determination? Perhaps
the absence of a lawsuit? The word of an administrator? And given this
information vacuum, how are athletes being educated about Title IX?”260
E. Admissions Preferences for Athletes at Selective Colleges and Universities
Although men and women are still often treated differently in college sports,
in admissions to selective institutions, athletes of both genders enjoy a
significant advantage over other applicants. William Bowen and Sarah Levin
observed in 2003: “[T]here are so many talented young people who want to
attend the leading colleges and universities, including many who present
exceptional qualifications outside of athletics that don’t translate into anything
like the same advantage in the admissions process.” 261
Title IX contributes to this advantage because, as Bowen and Levin noted,
“a school that formerly had, say, 300 (male) athletes playing intercollegiate
sports now needs 600 (male and female) athletes, assuming that the proportions
of men and women in the student body are roughly equal.”262 But the increasing
intensity of college athletics and athletic recruiting are also responsible, along
with the increased specialization of athletes that now starts at an early age.263
Increased specialization means fewer multi-sport athletes, which, in turn, means

256. Id. at 198—99.
257. Id. at 198.
258. Id. at 198, 200.
259. Id. at 198.
260. Id. at 203.
261. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & SARAH A. LEVIN, RECLAIMING THE GAME: COLLEGE SPORTS AND
AMERICAN VALUES 11 (2003).
262. Id. at 215.
263. Id. at 200.
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institutions must recruit more athletes than they otherwise would, augmenting
the admissions preference for athletes.264
The preference continues today, according to a recent examination of the
college-admissions process.265 Author Jeffrey Selingo writes: “When it comes
to getting into a selective school, you’re much better off taking up water polo,
fencing, rowing, or some other niche sport than playing the tuba in the band or
the lead in the school musical.”266 That is because, in Selingo’s words, “[m]ost
schools have many more athletic teams than orchestras or debate teams.”267
Rick Singer, who engineered the “Operation Varsity Blues” scam in 2019,
whereby wealthy parents paid him to find their children a “side door” into a
prestigious college, found that entrance in coaches’ need to fill their rosters in
less visible sports, such as fencing, field hockey, and water polo. He paid
several coaches to designate those children as recruited athletes, knowing that
designation would ease their paths to admission.268 The parents of one Yale
applicant “paid $1.2 million to have her designated as a star soccer recruit” even
though she did not play soccer.269 And the parents of an applicant to the
University of Southern California “paid $200,000 and photoshopped their
daughter rowing” to improve her chances of admission.270
Besides a vulnerability to fraud, this admission preference for athletes has
two major implications. First, Jeffrey Selingo notes that “[o]n campuses where
the competition to get in is stiff and seats fairly limited, admissions is often
turned into a zero-sum game because of athletics.”271 [emphasis in original].
The athlete gets in and the poet, artist, or budding inventor does not. Second,
because rowers, skiers, and golfers are overwhelmingly white, the athletic
preference at selective colleges makes the task of attracting a diverse student
body more challenging than it would otherwise be.272 A prime challenge for the
future, then, will be to ensure equal opportunity for male and female athletes
while improving the admissions chances of talented nonathlete applicants. Part
IV, which follows, will suggest remedies for this problem and for the others
264. Id. at 105. Political Scientist R. Shep Melnick argues that because of the substantialproportionality standard and institutional reluctance to cut men’s teams to achieve proportionality,
institutions have had to increase the number of women’s teams, with the result that “intercollegiate
sports are very expensive both in terms of dollars and, at selective schools, in terms of admissions
slots.” Melnick, supra note 16, at 12.
265. See generally SELINGO, supra note 16.
266. Id. at 149.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 146—147.
269. Id. at 187.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 199.
272. Id. at 190.
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discussed previously.
IV. ACHIEVING EQUITY: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
If colleges and universities are to achieve gender equity in sports under Title
IX, four sets of actors will need to make changes: the institutions themselves;
the NCAA; the federal Department of Education (including OCR and the Office
of Postsecondary Education); and the United States Congress. The suggested
changes are as follows:
A. Institutions
Institutions should accept, and attempt to comply with, the three-part test
announced in the 1979 Policy Interpretation instead of trying to change it or
evade it through roster manipulation. Specifically, they should seek to comply
with part one, which is the most viable choice for Title IX compliance because
it is clear, measurable, and attainable.273 Journalist Welch Suggs has observed,
regarding gender equity in college sports, that thus far, “nobody has come up
with a better means of allowing colleges to define ‘equitable’ for themselves
than the three-part test.”274 And “equitable” likely has a different meaning when
in 2010 women are fifty-seven percent of American undergraduates, than it had
in 1972, when fifty-seven percent of undergraduates were male.275
Justice lies in a recognition that when women are most of the
undergraduates in American colleges and universities, they should be most of
the athletes too. After all, when men were most of the undergraduates, they
were most of the athletes; just as athletic programs reflected the demographics
of the student body in 1972, they should do so in 2021. For that reason, recent
proposals to exclude “walk-on” athletes and the top revenue-producing team at
each institution, respectively, from the proportionality calculation miss the
mark.276
The former would revive a proposal of Secretary Paige’s Commission on

273. In contrast, part two is problematic because, after fifty years, few, if any, institutions can show
a continuing practice of expanding athletic opportunities for women, without any backsliding.
[Emphasis added]. Similarly, few, if any, institutions can satisfy part three by showing that no unmet
athletic interest among women students exists on campus, the women who might be interested in a new
sport lack the ability to sustain a viable team, and they lack reasonable competition against whom they
could play. Thus, part one is the most viable option for Title IX compliance. GURNEY ET AL., supra
note 12, at 151—52.
274. SUGGS, supra note 67, at 191.
275. Melnick, supra note 16, at 2.
276. Abigail H. Mabry, Note, Title IX, Proportionality, and Walk-Ons, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 497,
499 (2013); Courtney Tibbetts, Note, The FEMALE Act: Bringing Title IX into the Twenty-First
Century, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 697, 709 (2020).
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Opportunity in Athletics, which died on the vine. It would exclude walk-on
athletes from the count of male and female athletes for determining substantial
proportionality. According to one proponent, “[n]ot only would this [exclusion]
eliminate artificial caps on the number of walk-ons allowed on a team, but it
would alter the male-to-female-athlete ratio in a way that allows athletic
programs to achieve Title IX compliance.”277 The latter proposal would exhume
the Tower Amendment, which Congress rejected in 1974.278 The proposal
would remove the top revenue-producing sport at each institution from the
proportionality calculation.279 A proponent suggests that its adoption would
reduce the tendency to inflate women’s rosters and to cut men’s nonrevenue
teams.280 Because both proposals depend on disregarding current campus
demographics, though, the ideas they seek to resurrect should remain interred.
A recent suggestion that the 1979 Policy Interpretation and subsequent
“Clarifications” issued by OCR “have transformed Title IX from a mandate of
equal opportunity into a mandate for equal outcomes in the context of
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics” also discounts demographics.281
Because athletics are segregated by sex, assessing the equality of opportunity
by comparing the numbers of male and female athletes to the numbers of male
and female undergraduates is appropriate. A less precise measure would permit
institutions to view “equal opportunity” as merely providing teams for men and
women, regardless of vast differences between them in funding and other
support. Title IX demands fairness, and such differences would be
fundamentally unfair.
Ironically, the coronavirus may aid the cause of Title IX compliance in the
years ahead if institutions that eliminated teams in 2020 carefully consider
gender equity when deciding whether to revive those teams. Between March
and October of 2020, seventy-eight colleges and universities, across all three
NCAA divisions and including nonmembers of the NCAA too, eliminated three
hundred teams in the wake of the virus.282 Despite the frustration and
disappointment involved, these cuts could have a silver lining if any
reinstatement favors women’s teams at institutions where women are currently
underrepresented in sports. One result could be that substantial proportionality

277. Mabry, supra note 276, at 521.
278. Tibbetts, supra note 276 at 701.
279. Id. at 699-700.
280. Id. at 721.
281. BUSCH & THRO, supra note 29, at 39.
282. Molly Ott & Janet Lawrence, Colleges are Eliminating Sports Teams – and Runners and
Golfers are Paying More of a Price Than Football or Basketball Players, THE CONVERSATION (Mar.
3, 2021), the conversation.com/colleges-are-eliminating-sports-teams-and-runners-and-golfers-arepaying-more-of-a-price-than-football-or-basketball-players.

PORTO 32.1

2021]

1/10/22 12:49 PM

STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

299

is easier to achieve. Another could be that some varsity teams will transition to
club teams, keeping athletic opportunities available but enabling selective
institutions to reduce the number of recruited athletes and, along with it, their
admissions preference. Granting the athletic admissions preference to fewer
applicants or eliminating it would also signal to parents that the poet and the
percussionist will have the same chance at admission to a selective institution
as the placekicker and the point guard.
B. The NCAA
The NCAA could aid the cause of gender equity, particularly in Division I,
by reinstituting the Certification Program that it established in 1993 but
suspended in 2011. The Certification Program required Division I members to
complete a self-study on gender and racial equity every ten years, identifying
measurable goals and timetables for meeting them.283 When this program was
in effect, “the gender-equity assessment that was part of the program was a full
Title IX assessment.”284 Its resumption would likely motivate recalcitrant
institutions to improve athletic opportunities for women.
Another motivator would be an NCAA rule stating that any member
institution not compliant with Title IX would be ineligible for postseason play
in all sports until compliance was achieved.285 Finally, the NCAA could reduce
the allowable number of scholarships in FBS football from eighty-five to sixty
and could limit overall squad sizes (including walk-ons) to seventy-five or
eighty, thereby freeing both financial resources and participation opportunities
for women’s sports.286 A recent study projects that “[i]f football scholarships
were cut to sixty, the average college would probably save close to $1.5 million
annually—easily enough to finance an average-size FBS soccer team plus an
average-size FBS golf team, or an FBS tennis team plus [a] gymnastics team,
and have several hundred thousand dollars left over.”287 No institution would
be disadvantaged because everyone would have to abide by the same limits.
C. Department of Education
Within the DOE, OCR should do more to promote gender equity in sports,

283. GURNEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 43-44.
284. Id. at 148.
285. Id. at 41.
286. Andrew Zimbalist, What to Do About Title IX, in EQUAL PLAY: TITLE IX AND SOCIAL CHANGE
239 (Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 2007).
287. GURNEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 219. After all, National Football League (NFL) teams play
a regular season that is several games longer than the FBS college season with maximum active rosters
of forty-five players, plus a maximum of sixteen reserve and practice players.
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specifically, more aggressive enforcement of the three-part test. Such increased
enforcement is likely now that the Democratic Biden administration has
replaced the Republican Trump administration. Historically, a notable
difference exists between Democratic and Republican leadership at OCR:
Republicans view the resolution of individual complaints as the agency’s main
purpose, whereas Democrats view the investigation of such complaints as a
starting point for more comprehensive reforms.288
For the Biden administration, a part of being more comprehensive would be
to improve OCR’s monitoring of institutions to make sure they each designate
an employee to serve as Title IX coordinator, identify that person to the campus
community, and make the coordinator’s contact information easy to find.289 The
coordinators are the “ground troops” of Title IX enforcement; they are
responsible for making sure that their coworkers at individual institutions follow
Title IX, and the regulations require that at least one coordinator work in every
institution that receives federal funds for educational programs.290
A rejuvenated OCR should require coordinators to develop reporting
systems at their institutions whereby the following information is publicly
disclosed in literature and on the institution’s website: (1) which part of the
three-part test it is using to comply; (2) information about the institution’s
history and continuing practice of program expansion in athletics; and (3) the
methods it is using to meet the needs of qualified female athletes.291 Regarding
number three, OCR should establish a rebuttable presumption that if a certain
percentage of institutions within a conference offer a particular sport, then every
institution in that conference can sustain a viable team in that sport. OCR should
also establish a companion presumption that if a certain percentage of the high
schools from which a particular institution draws most of its students offer a
certain sport, then the subject institution can sustain a viable team in that
sport.292 These presumptions could nudge institutions to become proactive in
adding women’s teams.
Coordinators should establish and implement policies designed to protect
student whistleblowers from reprisal.293 They should also conduct annual
288. MELNICK, supra note 6, at 100.
289. STAUROWSKY ET AL., Chasing Equity, supra note 9, at 68.
290. Sandra Guy, Title IX at 45, SOCIETY FOR WOMEN ENGINEERS (SWE) MAGAZINE (Mar. 20,
2017), https://alltogether.swe.org/2017/03/title-ix-45/. The regulatory requirement of a Title IX
coordinator at every institution that receives federal funds is located at 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a).
291. STAUROWSKY ET AL., Chasing Equity, supra note 9, at 68. The latter could include identifying
conference members that offer a sport not offered by one’s own institution and determining the most
popular sports in high schools from which one’s institution customarily draws students.
292. I am indebted to Professor Erin Buzuvis for suggesting these presumptions. Letter from Erin
Buzuvis, Assoc. Dean for Acad. Aff., W.N.E. Sch. of L. (Jan. 17, 2021).
293. See id.
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informational sessions for coaches and athletes regarding Title IX’s application
to athletics. OCR should support the coordinators’ work by joining with the
NCAA and the Association of Title IX Administrators (ATIXA) to offer
periodic, mandatory training sessions for the coordinators themselves and
separate sessions for coaches and athletic administrators.294 No excuse exists
for a lack of “Title IX literacy” in either group.295 Those changes, along with a
return to the assertive enforcement of years past, would nudge institutions to
comply voluntarily instead of continuing past practices until a complaint is
filed.296
Another DOE component, the Office for Postsecondary Education, should
change its method of counting participants for EADA purposes; instead of
tallying the athletes present on the first competition date, it should substitute the
Title IX counting rules included in the Policy Interpretation. Those rules define
“participants” as athletes who are (a) receiving institutional support (e.g.,
coaching, equipment, medical and training room services) regularly during the
competitive season; (b) participating regularly in practice sessions and other
team meetings and activities during the season; (c) listed on the eligibility or
squad lists the institution maintains for each sport; or (d) because of injury,
cannot meet a, b, or c but still receive athletic scholarships.297 The same office
should cease counting male practice players as “women athletes” for EADA
reporting purposes. Instead, male practice players should count as men as long
as they receive the institutional support normally provided to varsity athletes,
such as coaching, equipment, and medical and training-room services, regularly
during the competitive season. Otherwise, they should not be counted for
EADA purposes.
D. Congress
Congress could aid Title IX enforcement by funding OCR adequately and
by granting the NCAA a limited antitrust exemption. During the Obama
administration, although OCR’s workload expanded dramatically, to more than
16,000 complaints in 2016, compared to less than half that number in 2009,
staffing remained at 1980s levels because Congress withheld the funds
necessary to hire additional staff. The invigorated enforcement and monitoring
advocated here—including proactive compliance reviews of institutions and
294. Charlotte Franklin, Title IX Administers a Booster Shot: The Effect of Private Donations on
Title IX, 16 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 145, 162 (2021).
295. Staurowsky & Weight, supra note 255, at 198.
296. Regarding the latter tendency by institutions, see Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX in U.S. College
Sports, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AM. SPORTS L. 404 (Michael A. McCann ed., 2018).
297. A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 239, 71415 (Jan.
16, 1996). See also Clarification, supra note 68, at 6.
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technical assistance and guidance to Title IX coordinators—will require that
Congress provide OCR with the funds necessary to do its job.298
Congress should also grant the NCAA an exemption from the antitrust laws,
in exchange for which, according to Professor Erin Buzuvis, “Congress could
require the NCAA to limit athletic spending, reducing the pressure to win at any
cost and making fair spending on women’s sports more likely.”299 The
exemption would enable the NCAA to avoid or at least to defend itself
successfully in lawsuits challenging [potential] rules that pursue educational
ends but have commercial consequences, such as capping coaches’ salaries or
reducing the lengths of competitive seasons. Such rules could free up additional
funds for women’s sports.300 Only Congress can spur the NCAA to make these
changes because only Congress can protect the NCAA from the antitrust
consequences of doing so.
CONCLUSION
Title IX is both a colossal achievement and a missed opportunity. The
achievement is the access to athletic competition that two generations of
America’s daughters have enjoyed. Regarding the missed opportunity, William
Bowen and Sarah Levin have observed, “Since [Title IX] mandated that colleges
and universities offer to women whatever athletic opportunities they provided
to men, it could have served as a signal to colleges and universities (and to the
NCAA) that it was time to recalibrate the entire athletics enterprise so that it
would be more congruent with educational goals.”301 The coronavirus pandemic
may necessitate the recalibration.302 It has triggered a massive purge of college
teams, and resurrecting them could be financially prohibitive. Thus, institutions
should favor restoring women’s teams to achieve substantial proportionality.
Small, selective schools should use the reduced need for athletes to limit, if not
eliminate, admissions preferences for recruits.303 If institutions, the NCAA,
298. MAATZ ET AL., supra note 31, at 10.
299. Buzuvis, supra note 296, at 406.
300. BRIAN L. PORTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NCAA: THE CASE FOR LESS
COMMERCIALISM AND MORE DUE PROCESS IN COLLEGE SPORTS 190 (2012).
301. BOWEN & LEVIN, supra note 261, at 214.
302. Bowen and Levin were not alone in arguing that Title IX could be a valuable device for
reforming college sports. See, e.g., BRIAN L. PORTO, A NEW SEASON: USING TITLE IX TO REFORM
COLLEGE SPORTS (2003) and Brian L. Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title IX as Catalyst for an
Alternative Model of College Sports, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 351 (1998).
303. Not all small institutions are selective, and less selective ones are unlikely to cut men’s sports,
even to achieve substantial proportionality, because they often rely on athletes—especially male
athletes—to reach their enrollment targets and ensure a reasonable number of male undergraduates. At
these institutions, though, the admission of an athlete is less likely to foreclose the admission of a more
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DOE, and Congress do their parts for gender equity, as suggested here, Title
IX’s supporters will have much to celebrate in 2022, the statute’s fiftiethanniversary year.

academically talented nonathlete than it would be at a small, selective institution. See SELINGO, supra
note 16, at 158.

